




Emily Riehl

Johns Hopkins University

# The mathematical multiverse: the case against a unified mathematical reality

Investigating Reality: A Philosophical, Mathematical, and Scientific Exploration

# My platonist view of mathematical reality



## My structuralist view of mathematical reality

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**Dedekind's Categoricity Theorem** All triples given by a set  $\mathbb{N}$ , an element  $0 \in \mathbb{N}$ , and a function  $\text{succ} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  satisfying **Peano's postulates** are **isomorphic**.

- $0$  is not the **successor** of any natural number.
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Q: Is 3 an element of 17? — Paul Benacerraf “What numbers could not be”

# Creation vs discovery



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


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



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


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In 1953, Serre **discovered** that for the vast majority of dimensions this count is finite. Algebraic topologists then **created** chromatic homotopy theory to **discover** properties about these functions in the dimensions where the full count is still unknown.



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- Certain mathematical questions cannot be resolved without **additional axioms**, e.g., assuming the existence of particular “large” sets.
- The axioms of first order logic and set theory with choice are **not universally true**!


# The axiom of choice

**Axiom of Choice:** From any family of non-empty sets it is possible to simultaneously choose an element from each set in the family.




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
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“The Axiom of Choice is obviously true, the well-ordering principle obviously false, and who can tell about Zorn’s lemma?” — Jerry Bona

## Mirrored sets




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
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
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


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<sup>1</sup>While this demonstrates that mirrored sets do not satisfy the **external** axiom of choice, as a boolean topos, they do satisfy the **internal** axiom of choice.

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Mathematics is at its most powerful when it's possible to exercise choice about choice, adopting it in certain domains while rejecting it in others.



2

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An alternate perspective on foundations is provided by **internal logics**, which provide domain-specific formal systems for particular mathematical “realities.”

- classical first order logic
- linear logic
- coherent or geometric logic
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E.g.: “by **path induction**, since equality is reflexive it is also symmetric” is a complete proof in homotopy type theory, but meaningless in other settings.



# Exploring the mathematical multiverse



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- The mathematician inputs each line of their proof in a precise syntax.
- The computer verifies the logical reasoning produces a valid deduction of the claimed mathematical statement.
- Depending on the sophistication of the computer program, it might also “assist” the mathematician in various ways:
  - By catching errors of reasoning (unjustified assumptions, missing cases, etc).
  - By keeping track of where they are in a complicated logical argument.
  - By suggesting or even automatically generating proofs (“auto-formalization”).

# Computer formalization of mathematics



*Formalized mathematics, in tandem with other forms of computerized mathematics<sup>2</sup>, provides better management of mathematical knowledge, an opportunity to carry out ever more complex and larger projects, and hitherto unseen levels of precision.*

*— Andrej Bauer, “The dawn of formalized mathematics,”  
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<sup>2</sup>Jacques Carette, William M. Farmer, Michael Kohlhase, and Florian Rabe. Big math and the one-brain barrier — the tetrapod model of mathematical knowledge. *Mathematical Intelligencer*, 43(1):78–87, 2021.

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Recent successes include:

- the **Kepler conjecture**, resolving a 1611 conjecture, 2003–2014, **HOL LIGHT**
- the **Feit-Thompson Odd Order Theorem**, a foundational result in the classification of finite simple groups, 2006–2012, **Coq**
- the **liquid tensor experiment**, formalizing condensed mathematics, 2020–2022, **LEAN**
- the **Brunerie number**, computing  $\pi_4 S^3 \cong \mathbb{Z}/2\mathbb{Z}$ , 2015–2022, **CUBICAL AGDA**

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## Could $\infty$ -category theory be taught to undergraduates?

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rkz



I'd argue that the traditional foundations of mathematics are not really suitable for "higher mathematics" such as  $\infty$ -category theory, where the basic objects are built out of higher-dimensional types instead of mere sets.

MkDocs documentation Haddock documentation Build with GHCJS and Deploy to GitHub Pages passing

An experimental proof assistant for synthetic  $\infty$ -categories.

## References

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- Nikolai Kudasov, Emily Riehl, Jonathan Weinberger, [Formalizing the  \$\infty\$ -categorical Yoneda lemma](#), *CPP* 2024, January 2024, 274–290; [arXiv:2309.08340](#)